Cyber and TRIA: Expanding the Definition of an  Act of Terrorism  to Include Cyber Attacks by Patel, Nehal
   
 
   
 
CYBER AND TRIA: EXPANDING THE 
DEFINITION OF AN “ACT OF TERRORISM” TO 





 The 9/11 terrorist attacks brought on financial losses that 
caused insurers and Congress to reevaluate how the United States 
approaches terrorism risk coverage.  Congress quelled concerns 
of insurers evading coverage of future terrorist attacks by 
enacting the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act in 2002. This Note 
considers the difficulties presented by the out-of-date language 
employed by Congress in 2002 and proposes amendments so that 
the Act more clearly covers acts of cyberterrorism, which are 
ever-growing in their destructive potential. 
INTRODUCTION 
 The tragic events of September 11, 2001 caused panic throughout 
industries in the United States.  The insurance industry experienced direct 
financial pain.  Due to the high insurance payouts1 from claims based on 
the September 11 attacks, insurers reevaluated their position, ultimately 
deciding the extremely high expected payouts and low predictability made 
terrorism risk insurance almost impossible to cover comfortably.  
Congress responded by enacting the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 
(“TRIA”),2 which created a federal program designed to facilitate 
reinsurance for terrorism risk.  Thereafter, insurers were required to 
participate in the program and insure terrorism risk.  The newly created 
program has yet to be activated, as the U.S. has not been subject to another 
catastrophic terrorist attack the level of the September 11 attacks.  
New terrorist groups have emerged that are focused on 
cyberwarfare and cyberterrorism.  Even though cyberattacks are more 
common now, Congressional reauthorization in 2007, 2015, and 2019 left 
TRIA’s language unchanged. This paper argues that TRIA’s language 
leaves ambiguity as to when the Secretary of the Treasury (“Secretary”) 
must certify a cyberattack as an act of terrorism. This ambiguity creates 
dangerous regulatory uncertainty for both insurers and the insured, as the 
Secretary’s certification determines an insurer’s decision to cover the 
event. 
 
† Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected May 2021. 
1 Insurance losses totaled $39.5 billion in U.S. dollars adjusted to 2008 dollars. 
9/11 and Insurance: The Eight Year Anniversary - Insurers Paid Out Nearly $40 
Billion, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE (Sept. 10, 2009), 
https://www.iii.org/press-release/9-11-and-insurance-the-eight-year-anniversary-
insurers-paid-out-nearly-40-billion-091009. 
2 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 201, 116 Stat. 
2337. 
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TRIA was reauthorized in December 2019.3  In such 
reauthorization, Congress extended the program until 2027, requesting 
Treasury research the effectiveness of the program in regards to 
cyberterrorism.4  Congress should have gone one step further by explicitly 
including cyberattacks as an act of terrorism. 
I. BACKGROUND: TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE 
A. Pre-September 11 Attacks 
 Before September 11, 2001, terrorism risk insurance coverage was 
widely available.  Since the 1930s, personal and commercial property 
insurance increasingly covered all risks of property loss, called all-peril 
coverage.5  Under all-peril coverage, insurers would compensate property 
losses regardless of the cause.6  The all-peril coverage eventually turned 
into general package policies, which came with certain exceptions, such 
as acts of war.7  By 1995, 93% of all homeowners’ policies were all-peril 
with explicitly stated limited exceptions.8  Acts of war were often an 
exception to coverage because acts of war are inherently catastrophic and 
can drain all the capital from insurers in a single event.9  Although acts of 
terrorism seem to parallel acts of war by causing similarly high losses, acts 
of terrorism were not among the exceptions in property insurance 
coverage.10   
The inconsistency in insurance coverage treatment can be 
attributed to general ignorance, due to extremely low probability and 
difficulty in defining “acts of terrorism.”11  Before 9/11, insurers simply 
did not consider terrorism attacks a credible threat, despite the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombings.12  Notably, 
many other countries’ insurance policies explicitly excluded terrorism risk 
due to increased terrorist activities in the 1970s and 1980s.13  Although 
many foreign insurers noted and addressed terrorism risk, insurers in the 
United States neglected any concern for terrorism risk. 
 
 
3 Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2019, H.R. 1865, 
116th Cong. § 501 (2019). 
4 H.R. 1865, § 502. The research conducted by Treasury, published in April 2020, 
indicated ambiguity and confusion as will be explained in this Note. See UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE: 
MARKET IS STABLE BUT TREASURY COULD STRENGTHEN COMMUNICATIONS 
ABOUT ITS PROCESS (2020). 
5 Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Terrorism Losses and All Perils Insurance, 
23 J. INS. REG. 3, 5 (2005). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 See id. (noting commercial property coverage likely was almost exclusively all-
peril, as commercial property coverage mirrored personal property coverage). 
9 Id. at 6. 
10 Id. at 5. 
11 Id. at 9, 11. 
12 Id. at 7, 11. 
13 Id. at 10, 11. 
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Additionally, acts of terrorism took many forms and came from 
many sources.  The United States had yet to recognize a legal definition of 
an “act of terrorism.”14  Further, typical act of war exclusions disclaimed 
coverage over “large losses from war and correlated warlike activities.”15  
Insurers may have assumed all attacks against the United States that 
caused extremely large monetary losses would fall under the act of war 
exclusion.  However, in the only pre-2001 case challenging the denial of 
an insurance claim based on an act of war exclusion, the Second Circuit 
denied an insurer the right to claim an act of war exclusion on a plane 
destroyed by terrorists.16  By September 11, 2001, terrorism risk was 
insured as an afterthought to general property insurance coverage.17   
B. Introduction to Terrorism Risk Insurance Act & Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Program 
On September 11, 2001, terrorists caused about 3,000 deaths18 and 
about $22 billion in property damage.19  In total, an estimated $35 billion 
to $75 billion in monetary losses were suffered.20  As a result, insurance 
providers were expected to make heavy payouts on claims against the 
attacks.21  Reinsurers were expected to compensate primary insurers for 
the payouts.22  Insurers and reinsurers had no choice.  Not only would the 
American public and leaders have ostracized insurers who considered 
rejecting claims on the September 11 attacks,23 but the only court case 
related to the issue was resolved in favor of the insured.24  
Although a terrorist attack against the United States was not 
surprising, the American people and insurers were stunned by this attack’s 
devasting losses.25  The monetary losses suffered were the highest of any 
 
14 Id. at 11. 
15 Richard Allyn & Heather McNeff, The Fall and Rise of Terrorism Insurance 
Coverage Since September 11, 2001, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 821, 823 (2003) 
(emphasis added). 
16 See Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 505 
F.2d 989, 1009–22 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding the doctrine of contra proferentem 
applies in this case because many terms in the exclusions were not judicially 
defined). 
17 See id. 
18 Allyn & McNeff, supra note 15, at 826. 
19 Adam Z. Rose & S. Brock Blomberg, Total Economic Consequences of 
Terrorist Attacks: Insights from 9/11, 16 PEACE ECONOMICS, PEACE SCIENCE AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 1, 6 (2010). 
20 See Allyn & McNeff, supra note 15, at 826.  See also, Kunreuther & Pauly, 
supra 5, at 4 (estimating insurance losses at $40 billion).   
21 See Allyn & McNeff, supra note 15, at 827 (citing the U.S. House Financial 
Services Committee letter stating that “it would be unpatriotic of insurers to try to 
avoid coverage of the attack based on ‘legal maneuvering’”). 
22 Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 5, at 11. 
23 See Allyn & McNeff, supra note 15, at 827 (noting that Congress wrote a letter 
directed at insurers, which stated  “that it would be unpatriotic of insurers to try 
to avoid coverage of the attack based on ‘legal maneuvering’”). 
24 Pan American World Airways, 505 F.2d 989, 1009–22 (2d Cir. 1974). 
25 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED 
STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
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disaster in United States history.26  The Congressional Research Service 
estimated the 9/11 attacks were the largest insurance loss from a terrorist 
attack, totaling $26.22 billion in property insurance losses.27 For reference, 
the next twenty largest attacks totaled $6.55 billion in property insurance 
losses.28  Insurers responded to the September 11 attacks by adding 
terrorism exclusions to new and renewed property and casualty 
insurance.29 This new policy effectively protected insurers from paying 
certain claims against future terrorist attacks.30  The National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) and most states approved the new 
terrorism risk exclusion.31  By February 2002, 45 states, the District of 
Columbia, and Puerto Rico, had approved the exclusion.32  Under these 
state-approved exclusions, if terrorists attacked the United States, ordinary 
citizens would have to pay for the damage sustained.33 
 Fearing the lack of terrorism risk coverage would be a significant 
factor in business decisions, particularly lending,34 Congress enacted the 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, signed into law by President Bush on 
November 26, 2002.35 TRIA created the Terrorism Risk Insurance 
Program (“TRIP”), a federal loss-sharing program for terrorism risk 
insurance coverage.36  TRIP requires insurers make terrorism risk 
coverage available for all property and casualty insurance policies for all 
consumers.37  For example, if a homeowner has a car, insurers must offer 
terrorism risk insurance for both the homeowner’s auto and home 
insurance policies.  This coverage requirement applies to all property and 
casualty policies.  
Insurers offer terrorism risk insurance at an average of 2.5 to 3.0 
percent of the total premium.38  Often, terrorism risk insurance is included 
 
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS 174–214 (2004) (detailing the multiple 
attacks planned or conducted against the United States by Islamic extremists and 
growing animosity against the United States in the decade leading up to the 
September 11th attacks). 
26 See Robert H. Jerry, II, Insurance, Terrorism, and 9/11: Reflections on Three 
Threshold Questions, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 95, 105 (2002) (noting that before the 
September 11th attacks, Hurricane Andrew was the largest insured disaster in 
United States history, which caused $16 billion in losses and was, to some degree, 
predicted). 
27 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT 
(TRIA) 1 (last updated Feb. 1, 2019). 
28 Id. 
29 Allyn & McNeff, supra note 15, at 828. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 830. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 27. 
35  Allyn & McNeff, supra note 15, at 828. 
36 Background on: Terrorism risk and insurance, INSURANCE INFORMATION 
INSTITUTE  (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.iii.org/article/background-on-terrorism-
risk-and-insurance. 
37 Id. 
38 Federal Insurance Office, Report on the Effectiveness of the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Program, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 25 (June 2018). 
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in policies for no extra cost.39  As of 2017, about 70–80% of consumers 
have purchased terrorism risk insurance.40  Under TRIP, insurers must pay 
the claims on certified acts of terrorism for those consumers while the 
federal government provides a federal backstop that allows insurers to 
reclaim the payments through higher future premiums across the board.41  
Since 2001, many terrorist attacks have occurred;42 however, none of the 
terror attacks have been certified as an act of terrorism for TRIP purposes. 
C. Cyberspace 
1. Cyberattacks in the United States 
Cyberattacks have been around since the 1980s.43  As the internet 
use skyrocketed in the 1990s and turn of the century, cyberattacks became 
sophisticated, enabling attackers to steal valuable data44 and destroy 
computer infrastructure.45   
 Hacking has resulted in hundreds of millions of financial losses. 
In 2007, hackers from the United States, Eastern Europe, and China stole 
45,700,000 credit and debit card numbers, eventually resulting in a $130 
million settlement.46  The hack has reportedly affected an additional 48 
million people.47  In 2008, hackers stole customer data from Internet 
Auction, one of Korea’s largest Internet shopping sites.48  About 10.8 
million customers were affected by the Internet Auction attack.  Hackers 
stole information from 3 billion Yahoo! accounts in 2013 and another 500 
million separately in 2014.49  These continued hacks “will cost the world 
$6 trillion annually by 2021,” according to Cybersecurity Ventures.50  
 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 29. 
41 See id. 
42 Peter Bergen, Albert Ford, et al., Terrorism in America After 9/11, NEW 
AMERICA (Sep. 18, 2019), https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-
america/part-i-overview-terrorism-cases-2001-today/. 
43 Michael Preciado, If You Wish Cyber Peace, Prepare for Cyber War: The Need 
for the Federal Government to Protect Critical Infrastructure from Cyber 
Warfare, 1 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 99, 104 (2012). 
44 See, e.g., id. at 111–12 (describing the cases of Kevin Poulsen and Kevin 
Mitnick). 
45 See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating 
Cyberattack in History, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.wired.com 
/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/.   
46 Tiffany Gates & Katy Jacob, Payments Fraud: Perception Versus Reality – A 
Conference Summary, 32 ECON. PERSPECTIVES 1, 7 (2009). 
47 Id. 
48 MinJae Lee & JinKyu Lee, The impact of information security failure on 
customer behaviors: A study on a large-scale hacking incident on the internet, 14 
Inf. Syst. Front. 375, 375 (2012). 
49 Soo Youn, The Capital One data breach is alarming, but these are the 5 worst 
corporate hacks, ABC NEWS (Jul 30, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com/ 
Technology/marriotts-data-breach-large-largest-worst-corporate-
hacks/story?id=59520391. 
50 Steve Morgan, Cybercrime Damages $6 Trillion By 2021, CYBERSECURITY 
VENTURES (Oct. 16, 2017), https://cybersecurityventures.com/hackerpocalypse-
cybercrime-report-2016/. 
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Some hacking is becoming politically motivated. “Hacktivism” is the 
recent movement, described by the Department of Justice’s National 
Infrastructure Protection Center, where hacker activists “launch politically 
motivated attacks on public web pages or e-mail servers.”51   
Hacking to steal information is only one highly destructive form 
of cyberattack.  Recently considered to be “the Most Devastating 
Cyberattack in History,” NotPetya was released by alleged Russian 
military hackers known as Sandworm in 2017.52  NotPetya was a piece of 
malware released into a single company’s update servers.53  Once released, 
the malware “spread automatically, rapidly, and indiscriminately.”54  
Within hours, NotPetya spread from its origin site in Ukraine to computers 
around the world – from hospitals in the United States to factories in 
Tasmania – even hitting the Russian state-sponsored oil company, 
Rosneft.55  Once in a computer, NotPetya encrypted the master boot 
records, immediately destroyed the computer’s ability to find its own 
operating system.56  If a computer cannot find and load its own operating 
system, it is crippled beyond repair.57  To jump from computer to computer 
within a single system, the worm stole the username and password of 
employees whose credentials could be used to log into multiple 
computers.58  Therefore, once in a company’s system, NotPetya crippled 
most company computers, effectively crippling the company’s ability to 
function.59  Maersk, Merck, TNT Express, Saint-Gobaian, Mondelez, and 
Rickitt Benckiser were all crippled, each required to pay nine-figures to 
replace the destroyed machines.60  In total, the White House estimated 
more than $10 billion in damage resulted worldwide.61  Only one month 
prior to the release of NotPetya, another kind of malware, WannaCry, 
caused between $4 billion and $8 billion in damage.62 
2. Cyberterrorism 
Cyberspace is an attractive mode of attack for terrorists for several 
reasons.  Terrorists with fewer resources can “target and affect large 
 
51 Eric J. Sinrod & William P. Reilly, Cyber-Crimes: A Practical Approach to the 
Application of Federal Computer Crime Laws, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 177, 183 (2000). 
52 Andy Greenberg, The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating 
Cyberattack in History, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.wired.com/ 










62 Id.  See also Jonathan Berr, “WannaCry” ransomware attack losses could reach 
$4 billion, CBS NEWS (May 16, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ 
wannacry-ransomware-attacks-wannacry-virus-losses/. 
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numbers of people” with just a computer and internet access.63  
Cyberterrorists can more easily blend into the common population of host 
states.64  Specific targeting of weaker, exploitable systems is easier.65  
Once the malware is developed and placed, launching an attack can be 
instantaneous and sometimes requires no further preparation.66  
Navigating through cyberspace is, in some circumstances, easier to 
navigate without detection than navigating through physical space.67 
Despite the appeal, cyberterrorism has only recently become a 
significant fear with the introduction of the WannaCry and NotPetya 
attacks.68  “Traditionally, most cyberattacks have been carried out by 
criminal organizations,” not by terror organizations.69  WannaCry and 
NotPetya, which “affected organizations in more than 150 countries” 
combined, are likely to spur more cyberterrorism activity.70   
Critical infrastructure is especially sensitive to a terrorist attack.  
In 2013, then-President Barack Obama issued an executive order 
addressing critical infrastructure cybersecurity, noting the “cyber threat to 
critical infrastructure continues to grow and represents one of the most 
serious national security challenges we must confront.”71  Terrorists tend 
to look to amass the most destruction in a single attack.  Malware like 
WannaCry and NotPetya has the potential to infiltrate and destroy U.S. 
infrastructure, such as hospital systems or electrical grids, leaving millions 
vulnerable instantaneously.  Although the United States is noting and 
addressing cybersecurity concerns of critical infrastructure,72 
cyberwarfare is a continually adaptive endeavor.73   
II. TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE PROGRAM 
A. Certification of an Act of Terrorism 
For TRIP to be initiated, the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
concurrence with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General of the 
 
63 Murat Dogrul, Adil Aslan & Eyyup Celik, Developing an International 
Cooperation on Cyber Defense and Deterrence against Cyber Terrorism, 
TURKISH AIR WAR COLLEGE 29, 32 (2011). 
64 See id. at 33 (“[Being in a host state] enables terrorists to remain unknown”).  
65 See id. (“…attacks are easy to carry out because many targets are poorly 
protected”). 
66 Id. 
67 See id. (“There are no physical barriers or check points that [terrorists] have to 
cross.”). 
68 Emil Metropoulos & Jeremy S. Platt, Global Cyber Terrorism Incidents on the 





71 Exec. Order. No. 13636, 78 FR 11739, 11739 (Feb. 12, 2013). 
72 See generally, id. 
73 See Michael Plachta, Council of Europe Adopts Resolution and 
Recommendation on Cyberterrorism, 31 NO. 7 INT’L ENF’T L. REP. 279 (Jul. 
2015). 
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United States, must certify an attack as an “act of terrorism.”74  The 
Secretary’s decision to certify or refrain from certifying an attack is final 
and “not… subject to judicial review.”75  Certification falls only on the 
Secretary of the Treasury’s shoulders, and may not be delegated “to any 
other officer, employee, or person . . .”76  Therefore, only the Secretary of 
the Treasury can initiate the program, and that initiation is based on a 
certification that cannot be contested by any party. 
TRIA details a four-pronged definition for certification of an ‘act 
of terrorism.’77  First, the attack must “be an act of terrorism.”78  Second, 
the attack must be a “violent act or an act that is dangerous to… human 
life;… property; or… infrastructure.”79  Third, the attack must result in 
damage within the United States, on an air carrier or vessel, or the premises 
of a United States mission.80  Finally, the attackers must have acted “on 
behalf of any foreign person or foreign interest, as part of an effort to 
coerce the civilian population of the United States or to influence the 
policy or affect the conduct of the United States Government by 
coercion.”81   
If the Secretary of the Treasury certifies an attack as an act of 
terrorism, the program is subject to a triggering threshold based on total 
insurance losses from the attack.82  Originally set at $5 million in 2002, 
subsequent reauthorizations of TRIA in 2007 and 2015 raised the 
threshold to $100 million and $200 million, respectively.83  If an attack 
has caused more than $200 million in damages and was certified as an act 
of terrorism for TRIP purposes, insurers must cover claims due to the 
attack.  The program remains in effect up to $100 billion in losses per 
year.84  If certified acts of terrorism have caused more than $100 billion in 
covered losses in a year, the losses above the $100 billion threshold may 
not be covered by insurers.  
 
74 Fed. Ins. Office, supra note 38, at 29. 
75 Terrorism Risk Ins. Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 102(1)(C). 
76 Id. at § 102(1)(D). 
77 Id. at § 102(1)(A).  In addition to the four-pronged definition, the Act provides 
an exception to certification if “the act is committed as part of the course of a war 
declared by Congress.”  § 102(1)(B).  However, Congress last declared a war in 
1942, despite the United States engaging in warfare since 1942.  United States 
Senate, Official Declarations of War by Congress (2010) 
https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/h_multi_sections_and_teasers/ 
WarDeclarationsbyCongress.html.   
78 Id. at § 102(1)(A)(i). 
79 Id. at § 102(1)(A)(ii). 
80 Id. at § 102(1)(A)(iii). 
81 Id. at § 102(1)(A)(iv). 
82 Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 36. 
83 See § 102(1)(B)(ii) (disallowing certification of attacks wherein “property and 
casualty insurance losses resulting from the act, in the aggregate, do not exceed 
$5,000,000”).  See also, Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act 
of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-160, 121 Stat. 1839; Terrorism Risk Insurance Program 
Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-1, 129 Stat. 3. 
84 See Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 36. 
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The definition of an act of terrorism under TRIA has not been 
interpreted by courts for two reasons.  First, although there have been 
many terror attacks since 2001, none have risen to the financial threshold 
required to be certified.85  Therefore, there has been no reason to interpret 
the statute.  However, even if TRIP were to be initiated, TRIA specifically 
denies the courts the ability to adjudicate the Secretary’s certification.86 
Therefore, the somewhat abstract process of certification 
concerned Congress in light of questions of certifying the Boston 
Marathon bombing.87  For clarity purposes, Congress required the 
Secretary of the Treasury to “conduct and complete a study on the process 
by which the Secretary determines whether to certify an ‘act of terrorism’ 
under TRIA…”88  The Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) fulfilled 
that request by issuing a report in October 2015 on TRIP Certification.89  
The report focused on the procedure of efficiently certifying, rather than 
the substance of certification.90 
The Treasury explained three “general criteria” required for 
certification, which traced the second, third, and fourth prongs of the 
definition of an “act of war” under TRIA.91  Under Treasury’s general 
criteria, first, the act must “be a violent act or an act that is dangerous to 
human life, property, or infrastructure…”92  Second, the attack must “have 
resulted in damage within the United States.”93  Finally, the act must “have 
been committed by an individual or individuals, as part of an effort to 
coerce the civilian population of the United States or influence the policy 
or affect the conduct of the United States Government by coercion.”94  
Treasury noted the first and third criteria posit “a number of potential 
permutations” and add to the “complexity of the certification analysis.”95   
 
85 In April 2013, the Boston Marathon bombing,  which President Barack Obama 
called an “act of terror,” resulted in less than $5 million in damages, according to 
the Massachusetts Department of Insurance.  Baird Webel, Terrorism Risk 
Insurance: Issue Analysis and Overview of Current Program, Congressional 
Research Service, 2 (July 23, 2014).  The Boston Marathon bombing was “one of 
the highest-profile attacks on U.S. soil since Sept. 11, 2001,” killing three people 
and wounding 260 others.  Nate Raymond, Boston Marathon bomber appeals 
conviction, death sentence, REUTERS (Dec. 27, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boston-bombings-appeal/boston-marathon-
bomber-appeals-conviction-death-sentence-idUSKCN1OQ1F4. 
86 See Terrorism Risk Ins. Act of 2002 § 102(1)(C). 
87 See Terrorism Risk Ins. Program Reauthorization Act of 2015 § 107. 
88 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, THE PROCESS FOR CERTIFYING AN “ACT 
OF TERRORISM” UNDER THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002, (Oct. 
2015). 
89 See generally, id. 
90 See generally, id. 
91 Id. at 5. The general criteria excluded the first prong that the attack be an act of 
terrorism, as Treasury found this prong to be circular and therefore did not add 
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B. Applying TRIA to Cyberattacks 
 The undisputable discretion given to the Secretary of the Treasury 
presents legal issues.  First, without legal precedent or guidance on 
certification, the Secretary’s decision to certify an attack can fall on 
arbitrary judgments.  Second, as the Secretary’s decision is final, 
certification of an act of terrorism is fully removed from the President’s 
Article II powers.  The only guidance published by Treasury on 
certification of an act of terrorism reiterated the definition of an “act of 
terrorism” without laying out a method of analyzing the definition.”96  The 
public and insurers are left guessing how the Secretary of the Treasury will 
interpret TRIA’s definition of an “act of terrorism” without useful 
guidance from Treasury or Congress.   
 
1. The Search for a Violent or Dangerous Act in 
Cyberspace 
The Secretary would first have to determine whether the attack is 
a violent act or at least one dangerous to human life, property, or 
infrastructure.  For an act to be violent, it must be “marked by the use of 
usually harmful or destructive physical force.”97  Cyberattacks are not 
typically thought of as physical, but there are physical aspects of a 
cyberattack.  The attackers are moving through cyberspace – a non-
physical medium – and may be attacking a non-physical system, such as a 
hospital electronic medical record system or an electrical grid.  However, 
some bugs may be created that can overheat computers, crashing 
computers through use of some harmful physical force.98  Whether an 
attack is dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure is highly 
factual.  Unlike a physical attack, where material weapons are used to 
destroy property cyberattacks may take many forms and produce many 
outcomes, some of which are far from physical. 
Stealing data may be dangerous to human life, but only if the data 
is highly sensitive.  For example, if a piece of data suggests the location of 
a United States spy abroad, a hacker who illegally obtains that piece of 
data by means of a cyberattack may fall under the first of the three general 
criteria.  However, this one piece of data may be hidden in a mountain of 
stolen data.  The hacker may not even know what data was obtained.  The 
Secretary may similarly be unaware.  For the Secretary to make a 
determination of dangerousness to human life, the Secretary must not only 
know exactly what data was stolen, but also what inferences may be made 
based on the data, and how those inferences may be used to threaten U.S. 
lives. 
Data may also be seen as a form of property.  If so, stealing data 
owned by a U.S. person or business is inherently dangerous to property.  
However, it is unclear whether TRIA was intended to protect this type of 
 
96 See generally, id. 
97 Violent, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019). 
98 Hamilton Turner, et al., Bad Parts: Are Our Manufacturing Systems at Risk of 
Silent Cyberattacks?, 41, IEEE Computer and Reliability Societies (May/June 
2015), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=7118094. 
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property.  Congress neglected to define “property” under TRIA.99  And 
“basing the definition of ‘property’ on a judgment call…allows the 
government’s interests to warp the private rights” of U.S. citizens.100  
TRIA gives Secretary of the Treasury unopposed unilateral discretion in 
determining how to define property.  When considering the definition of 
‘property’ under the Bankruptcy Act, the Supreme Court has noted “the 
most important consideration limiting the breadth of the definition of 
‘property’ lies in the basic purpose of the Bankruptcy Act…”101  The Court 
looked to the Act’s framers’ intent to determine purpose.102   
The framers of TRIA did not explicate an interest in a certain type 
of property.  However, the framers enacted TRIA a year after the 
September 11 attacks.  TRIA was effectively a Congressional response to 
state-approved terrorism risk exclusions after the September 11 attacks.103  
The stated purpose of the Act did not point to a certain type of property, 
but rather focused on providing property and casualty insurance.104  So the 
framers’ definition of “property” may be derived from what is covered 
under property and casualty insurance.  Cyber liability falls under property 
and casualty insurance.105  However, typically cyber insurance policies 
contain exclusions, including intellectual property,106  data breaches,107 
and common physical causes of computer crashes.108  For example, the 
standard commercial property policy excludes perils caused by power 
surges, electrical disturbances, temperature changes, and mechanical 
 
99 See generally, Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 
Stat. 2322. 
100 Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S.Ct. 1933, 1957 (2017) (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
101 Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970) (citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 
U.S. 234, 244 (1934)). 
102 Id. (citing Swarts v. Fourth Nat‘l Bank, 117 F. 1, 3 (8th Cir. 1902)). 
103 See Allyn & McNeff, supra note 15, at 828. 
104 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act at § 101(b) (stating the purpose of the Act 
was “to establish a temporary Federal program that provides for a transparent 
system of shared public and private compensation for insured losses resulting 
from acts of terrorism”); Id. at § 101(b)(1) (stating the program was designed to 
“protect consumers by addressing market disruptions and ensure the continued 
widespread availability and affordability of property and casualty insurance for 
terrorism risk”). 
105 See Summit Insurance Services, Property and Casualty 
https://www.summitinsuranceservices.com/services/property-and-casualty/ 
(advertising property and casualty coverage, including “newer products such as 
cyber liability insurance”). 
106 Dan Burke, Cyber Insurance 101: What Cyber Insurance Covers, 2020, 
WOODRUFF SAWYER (2019), https://woodruffsawyer.com/cyber-liability/cyber-
basics/. 
107 Catherine Del Prete, Common Exclusions Invoked by Cyber Carriers to Deny 
Coverage, PERKINS COIE: TECH RISK REP. (2019) 
https://www.techriskreport.com/2019/02/common-exclusions-invoked-cyber-
carriers-deny-coverage/. 
108 See Marianne Bonner, Coverage For Computers and Data Under a 
Commercial Property Policy, THE BALANCE SMALL BUSINESS: BUSINESS 
INSURANCE, (Nov. 29, 2019) https://www.thebalancesmb.com/commercial-
property-policy-computers-and-data-462677. 
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breakdown.109  The standard policy’s exclusions are all typical methods 
malware, like NotPeyta and WannaCry, destroy computers. 
As TRIA requires insurers to provide terrorism risk insurance for 
all covered property and casualty insurance, these exclusions are 
problematic for certifying a cyberattack on the basis that the attack is 
dangerous to property for two reasons.  First, if the Secretary of the 
Treasury defines property by the purpose of the Act, property does not 
include stolen intellectual property, stolen data, or destroyed computers.  
The purpose of the Act makes clear property is defined by property and 
casualty insurance coverage.  Indeed, Congress limited TRIP certification 
based on a threshold of aggregate property and casualty insurance 
losses.110  And Congress further defined “insured loss” as “losses resulting 
from an act of terrorism…that is covered by primary or excess property 
and casualty insurance.”111  So the exclusions provide a safeguard for 
insurers in the event the Secretary of the Treasury intends to certify a 
cyberattack that falls under an exclusion.  
Second, insurers are allowed to apply exclusions to claims.  
Nothing in TRIA overrides exclusions.112  By only attaching TRIP-
required payments to active property and casualty insurance claims,113 
Congress implicitly allowed insurers to forego payments on any types of 
terror attacks as long as insurers excluded coverage for that type of claim 
under all circumstances.  For example, active act of war exclusions still 
apply to policies.  If a hostile state attacks the United States, insurers would 
not pay claims, nor be expected to pay claims, due to act of war 
exclusions.114   
Although the aforementioned exclusions would also be applied 
narrowly to cyber risk insurance policies, such exclusions would likely 
hold.  Courts tend to construe insurance policies narrowly.115  Under the 
doctrine of contra proferentem, any ambiguity in an exclusion is generally 
construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured.”116  Contra 
proferentem especially applies when insurers know the language in their 
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policies are ambiguous.117  However, courts only apply contra 
proferentem in cases of ambiguous exclusions.118  So, if insurers have 
reason to make the language in such exclusions as exact as possible, courts 
will not have reason to apply contra proferentem against insurers.  
Recently policyholders have won cases in which insurers rejected claims 
based on intellectual property exclusions.119  There is a growing body of 
caselaw against these standardized exclusions, forcing insurers to more 
precisely define their exclusions.  So, even if claims are submitted on a 
TRIP-certified act of terrorism, the exclusions would likely apply. 
The final prong of the first criteria presents a similar issue, as 
“infrastructure” is not defined by the statute.120  In fact, “infrastructure” is 
not mentioned again in the statute.121  Courts have not defined the term 
“infrastructure,” but under the same logic as the second prong, network 
infrastructure may be protected under TRIA.  Cyber insurance typically 
includes network security and privacy liability, which covers “data breach, 
malware infection, cyber extortion demand, ransomware, [and] business 
email compromise.”122  These are typical of cyberattacks.  At the time of 
TRIA enactment, Congress was likely considering physical U.S. 
infrastructure, such as building, bridges, and electric power grids.  
However, by setting the purpose of the Act in terms of property and 
casualty insurance, Congress may have given rise to terrorism risk 
coverage for any type of network infrastructure, including business 
network systems.  Therefore, the Secretary may be able to determine a 
terrorist hack is dangerous to infrastructure. 
Certification of more destructive types of cyberattacks, such as 
NotPetya, would be easier to justify.123  NotPetya was designed to, and 
did, destroy computers owned by U.S. businesses, hospitals, and 
 
117 Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 505 F.2d 
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120 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, §102, 116 
Stat. 2322, 2323–2327 (defining various terms applicable to TRIA). 
121 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002. 
122 See Dan Burke, supra, note 107.  See also, AMTRUST FINANCIAL, Network 
Security and Privacy Liability Coverage (Nov. 2014) (detailing all cyber 
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Hostile Acts exclusions insurers have invoked in response to NotPetya.  
Menapace, supra note 114. 
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infrastructure systems.124  Such a virus is inherently dangerous to human 
life, property, and infrastructure.  However, viruses like NotPetya are 
highly sophisticated and require intensive cyber capabilities to develop.125  
For example, NotPetya was developed over a period of a seven years.126  
Russian hackers created NotPetya from two separately developed pieces 
of software – Mimikatz and EternalBlue.127  Mimikatz was created by a 
French security researcher to demonstrate a vulnerability in Microsoft’s 
operating system.128  EternalBlue was created by the U.S. National 
Security Agency, “but leaked in a disastrous breach of the agency’s 
ultrasecret files earlier in 2017.”129  Without such fortune, the 
cybercriminals would have been unlikely to independently create such a 
sophisticated virus.   
2. The Necessity of U.S. Damage 
The second general criterion that the attack must “have resulted in 
damage in the United States.”130  Damage is defined as “harmful effects 
on someone or something.”131  Based on the timing of enactment relative 
to the September 11 attacks, the framers of TRIA likely considered 
physical damage to U.S. lives, property, and infrastructure when 
legislating.  However, since then, the concept of damage has expanded, 
especially in cyberspace.  Although cyberattacks may produce physical 
damage,132 most damage is not physical.133  Cybercrime costs typically 
include “damage and destruction of data, lost productivity, theft of 
intellectual property, theft of personal and financial data, embezzlement, 
fraud, post-attack disruption to the normal course of business, forensic 
investigation, restoration and deletion of hacked data and systems, and 
reputational harm.”  Some cyberattacks that produce physical damage 
could easily fall under the second prong of Treasury’s criteria.  An attack 
that physically damages computers in the United States,134 or renders them 
 
124 Although, as noted above, some policies contain exclusions that reject 
coverage for this type of damage. 
125 See Greenburg, supra note 45 (detailing the creation of NotPetya, which was 
developed by combining two highly sophisticated viruses, one made by a French 
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completely useless,135 would meet any definition of “damage” imagined 
by TRIA framers. 
However, most cyberattacks against U.S. systems typically will 
not actually result in damage.  For example, a hack may result in stolen 
data.  But no data will be damaged.  The data will be copied onto the 
hacker’s system, but it would remain in the original system.  In fact, 
successful hacking includes concealing or destroying evidence that the 
hacker is even in the system.136  Hackers will use programs like Hacker 
Defender to “alter the kernel and return false information to system calls, 
rendering useless most tools” that detect signs of system compromise.137  
A hacker may therefore enter a system, steal data, and exit without the host 
knowing she was there.   
Data breaches are not as geographically identifiable as physical 
attacks.  When terrorists attacked the United States on September 11, 
2001, no one questioned where the attacks occurred.  However, data is 
stored in servers.  Servers may be located in the United States, but data 
centers are located all over the world.138  Due to the ease of relaying data 
across continents, U.S. data owned by U.S. firms is sometimes stored 
abroad.139  For example, Google has nineteen data centers.140  Eight of 
these centers are located either in South America, Europe, or Asia.141  In 
order to safeguard data, Google “distribute[s] all data…across many 
computers in different locations” rather than “storing each user’s data on 
a single machine or set of machines.”142  The data is then chunked and 
replicated “over multiple systems to avoid a single point of failure.”143  
Google intentionally spreads data across its global network of data centers 
to lower the risk to any individual customer.   
However, this security protocol creates difficulties for TRIP-
certification purposes.  Hackers who enter a network system in the United 
States, may, even unknowingly, steal data that is located in a data center 
outside of the United States.  Data stolen from servers outside of the 
United States would not meet the standard imposed by the second Treasury 
criteria.  If a hacker stole Google data, and caused $200 million of property 
and casualty damage, but some of the data was not located inside the 
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United States, the $200 million certification threshold would likely not be 
met.  Even if a NotPetya-like virus was introduced to the Google network, 
causing $200 million of physical damage to Google servers, the threshold 
would not be met if some of that damage occurred on a server located 
outside of the United States.   
3. Attribution 
Difficulties in attribution in cyberspace may frustrate the third of 
Treasury’s general criteria.  The third criterion requires the act to “have 
been committed by an individual or individuals, as part of an effort to 
coerce the civilian population of the United States or influence the policy 
or affect the conduct of the United States Government by coercion.”144  
This criterion has two parts.  First, the attack must be committed by an 
individual or individuals.  Second, the individual or individuals must have 
intended to coerce the U.S. population, influence U.S. policy, or affect 
U.S. Government conduct.  Typically, if an attack can be attributed to a 
terror organization, the intent requirement may be satisfied implicitly.  
Terrorism, by definition, is “use of violence and intimidation, especially 
for political purposes.”145  Terrorists’ goals are the stated intent 
requirement.  Therefore, the government simply needs to make a 
determination of attribution to satisfy the third criterion. 
Attribution is also necessary because of act of war exclusions.  If 
the attack is an act of war, insurers will not be required to make payments 
on claims.  Per typical war risk exclusion language, an act of war must be 
committed by “any government or sovereign power,…military, naval or 
air forces,… or by an agent of any such government, power, authority, or 
forces.”146  The attack must be “hostile” or “warlike.”147  For an attack to 
fall under an act of war exclusion, a governmental body or association is 
a necessary element. 
Attribution in cyberspace for purposes of TRIP certification may 
prove difficult.  Generally, “establishing attribution for cyber operations 
is difficult but not impossible.”148  Cyberspace is an open world.  Any 
actor, from state-sponsored organizations to individuals in a basement, 
may commit a cyberattack. As cyberattacks usually soon met with patches 
to render the repeated use futile, successful cyberattacks are novel methods 
or viruses created for one-time use.  This further creates difficulties in 
tracking and tracing the attack down to the original source. 
But, although attribution is difficult, “[e]very kind of cyber 
operation – malicious or not – leaves a trail.”149  But because of the 
complexities involved in novel cyberattacks, according to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), “[n]o simple technical process or 
automated solution for determining responsibility for cyber operations 
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exists.”150  So the FBI is convinced it will eventually track down the 
originator of any cyberattack, but “the painstaking work in many cases 
requires weeks or months of analyzing intelligence and forensics to assess 
culpability.”151  How many months it may take to attribute an attack is 
uncertain, as it depends on the sophistication of the virus and the attackers.  
For example, the WannaCry ransomware was introduced onto computer 
systems worldwide on May 12, 2017.152  In December of 2017, seven 
months later, the United States attributed the attack to hackers backed by 
North Korea.153 
As part of the 2015 reauthorization of TRIA, Congress requested 
Treasury conduct a study to examine and analyze “the establishment of a 
reasonable timeline by which the Secretary must make an accurate 
determination on whether to certify an act as an act of terrorism.”154  
Treasury declined to delineate any kind of timeline after analyzing the 
possibilities.155  Treasury suggested “the uncertainty the Secretary may 
face when making a responsible assessment of whether an act is an act of 
terrorism” requires an unknown amount of time.  “An inflexible timeline 
for the certification process that would apply uniformly and rigidly to 
potentially disparate circumstances is impractical.”156  Treasury was silent 
on the possibility of a flexible timeline.   
The speed of the certification process matters.157  Uncertainty on 
whether insurers will be required to pay claims on an attack creates lags in 
rebuilding and stabilizing after an attack.  Any delays will be “financially 
significant to consumers, insurers, policyholders, and taxpayers.”158  If the 
government requires months, as was suggested by the FBI, to attribute an 
attack to a terrorist organization, TRIA may fail to provide financial 
stability. 
Due to act of war exclusions, unless a cyberattack is clearly 
committed by terrorists, insurers would likely attempt to deny claim 
payments unless absolutely required.  Even after the September 11 attacks, 
“there was a general concern that some insurers might attempt to deny 
converge under existing policies by invoking the war risk exclusion.”159  
This is true even though the attack was quickly attributed to al Qaeda.  If 
an attack like the WannaCry ransomware were to be considered for TRIP 
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cause major financial strife, as insurers may hold payments until 
attribution was made.  Even after attribution is made, insurers may then 
attempt to apply act of war exclusions on claims.  This delay is not only 
destructive to the financial systems that rely on TRIP but also due to 
certification ambiguity. 
III. TRIP CERTIFICATION CRITERIA SHOULD EXPLICITLY INCLUDE 
CYBERTERRORISM 
 The unique qualities of cyberspace and cyberattacks create 
difficulties in certifying a cyberterrorist attack as an act of terrorism under 
TRIA.  Congress reauthorized TRIP in 2019 without any changes.  
Congress should have considered these difficulties as the probability of 
cyberterrorists attacking U.S. targets rises.  And Congress should have 
amended the definition of an “act of terrorism” so as to cover 
cyberterrorism.  This amended definition would have reduce regulatory 
uncertainty and ensure insured parties can rely on the guarantees of TRIA. 
A. Defining “Property” and “Infrastructure” 
Congress should have specifically define property to include 
intangible property like intellectual property, data and computer software.  
If Congress explicitly includes intangible property as subject to TRIA 
coverage, the most likely cyberterrorist attacks, hacks, would be covered 
under TRIA.  In addition, explicit inclusion of intangible property, data, 
and software under TRIA would enable the Secretary to apply the 
definition of an act of terrorism to more nuanced types of cyberattacks 
quickly and efficiently.  Such an efficient response would quell the fears 
that initiated TRIA in the first place.160  Efficiency in certification 
decisions is crucial for insurers and their insured. With an expanded 
definition of property, both insurers and insured would be better informed 
on their responsibilities in protecting such property and in responding to 
an attack. 
Infrastructure should also be defined to include network 
infrastructure that is both tangible (hardware) and intangible (software)161  
for the same reasons Congress should have expanded the definition of 
property. 
B. Expanding Attacks to Cyberspace 
 Treasury’s second criterion requires the damage occurred to have 
resulted in the United States.  The geographic requirement works well for 
physical attacks.  However, physical components of the networks that 
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make up cyberspace are found all over the world.162  Even data about 
U.S. citizens is stored all over the world.163 
 Congress should have amended the definition of an act of 
terrorism to reflect this expansion.  Currently, the damage caused, 
according to TRIA, must occur within the United States, on an air carrier 
or vessel, or the premises of a United States mission.164  However, as more 
and more attacks are located in cyberspace, TRIA should reflect the shift 
in location by clearly including damage that occurs against U.S. property 
but generally within cyberspace.  
C. Streamlining Attribution 
 Finally, as certification decisions are complex, such decisions may 
require months to finalize.  Attribution challenges would only add to this 
delay.165  Attribution is, and will always be, a key and difficult process in 
cyberattacks because of the ease of anonymity in cyberspace.  Congress 
should have attempted to expedite attribution by statutorily creating a 
process by which the Executive determines attribution of cyberattacks.  
Congress may set up a joint task force specifically for the purpose of TRIA 
attribution.166  The task force would be required to determine attribution 
within a specified time period.  At the end of the period, if no attribution 
is made, the Secretary, with the advice of the task force, would move or 
decline to certify the attack as an act of terrorism.   
CONCLUSION 
 Under TRIA as written, the Secretary seems to have ultimate 
power to certify attacks as an act of terrorism.  The Secretary’s 
certification decision cannot be delegated to anyone else and cannot be 
challenged in court.167  The question is not whether the Secretary can 
certify a cyberattack as an act of terrorism.  The question is whether the 
Secretary will do so.   
In cyberspace, events happen almost instantaneously, leading to 
immediate disastrous effects.168  If the Secretary does not know whether 
she should certify the attack as an act of terrorism, insurers and the insured 
do not either. Not only does the uncertainty tie the hands of businesspeople 
making decisions based upon potential certifications, but the ultimate 
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losses fall upon the insured.  Data hacking is a highly lucrative activity for 
cybercriminals,169 and hacking makes up a significant portion of 
cybercriminal activity today.170  Without certification, hacks claimed by 
terrorists that are not covered by cyber insurance will continue to fall upon 
the shoulders of the insured.  
Congress reauthorized TRIP in 2019. To ensure consistent, 
efficient application of the certification process under TRIA, Congress 
should have augmented the Secretary’s power to certify cyberattacks as 
acts of terrorism.  Simply clarifying the Secretary’s power under TRIA 
would have encouraged the Secretary to take steps to mitigate damages 
suffered by the insured.  Additionally, requesting government agencies to 
work together to tackle attribution in cyberspace would further the goal of 
efficient use of TRIA.  As of 2019, the Secretary has not found a need to 
certify any cyberattack as an act of terrorism.  However, hacks in the 
aggregate are expected to cause $6 trillion in damages by 2021.171  As 
cyberattacks become more common, the need for understanding how the 
Secretary may use TRIA to respond to the issue rises.   
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